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This article explores K. E. Løgstrup’s1 ontological ethics, understood as 
an ethics rooted in interdependence. Interdependence, the fact that human 
beings always hold power over each other, has two very different aspects, 
which I will call negative and positive, each of them in turn leading to 
different aspects of ontological ethics. By negative and positive I mean the 
two opposing possibilities of all human interaction that we can either 
destroy the other person’s life (to a greater or smaller degree) or cause 
the other person’s life to flourish. We can either be a blessing in the other 
person’s life or a destroyer, as Løgstrup sometimes puts it. The focus of 
this article is to explore the positive aspect of interdependence. This is done 
for two connected reasons. Firstly, the positive aspect of Løgstrup’s 
analysis of interdependence seems to be largely overlooked because the 
work done on interdependence has tended to focus on the negative aspect, 
i.e. the threatening side of interdependence, which leads to his work on the 
ethical demand. Secondly, the positive aspect of interdependence actually 
provides the origin and foundation of Løgstrup’s so-called sovereign 
expressions of life. The overall aim is to provide a coherent exposition of 
Løgstrup’s ethics. However, the result is not a normative ethics upon 
which we may act, but rather a descriptive diagnosis of interdependence 
as the basic ontological condition of human social life, where the 





                                                     
1 Knud Ejler Løgstrup (1905-1981) was a Danish theologian and philosopher. He was very 
influential in Scandinavia and to some extent in Germany, where he stayed in contact with 
Martin Heidegger until Heidegger’s death in 1976. In the English-speaking world, he has 
remained mostly unknown, but during the 1990s Alasdair MacIntyre was influenced by his 
reading of Løgstrup, and results of this are his articles on Løgstrup (cf. MacIntyre 2007 and 
2010). Useful introductions to Løgstrup’s life and thought are available in Alasdair Macintyre 
and Hans Fink’s “Introduction” to the 1997 translation of Løgstrup’s main work, The Ethical 
Demand (cf. Løgstrup 1997) and in Kees van Kooten Niekerk’s “Introduction” in Beyond the 
Ethical Demand (Niekerk 2007).  
Useful information is also available at the Løgstrup Archive, Aarhus University: 
http://loegstrup.au.dk/en/loegstruparchive/. 
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1. Interdependence as the basis of Løgstrup’s ontological ethics 
Establishing interdependence as the basis or foundation of Løgstrup’s 
ontological ethics immediately raises three questions which will serve as a 
framework for the following analysis: 
1. What is interdependence? 
2. What is to be understood by Løgstrup’s ontological ethics? 
3. How does interdependence serve as the basis for Løgstrup’s 
ontological ethics? 
        Let us begin with the first question, what is to be understood by 
interdependence? 
Løgstrup does not use the term in The Ethical Demand, but in 1961, he 
adopts it from Theodor Geiger in the book Art and Ethics [Kunst og etik].2 Still, 
interdependence lies at the root of The Ethical Demand, this is evident already 
from the outset, where Løgstrup uses an example to show how the adult has 
power over the child and that this power can permanently influence the child’s 
life. However, this power and its potentially devastating effects do not only 
pertain to the child’s relation to the adult, Løgstrup states, and he continues: it 
is 
[…] in one degree or another true also of all the relationships in which we deal with 
one another. An individual never has something to do with another person without 
him holding something of their life in his hands. It may be a very small matter, 
involving only a passing mood, a dampening or quickening of spirit, a deepening or 
removal of some dislike. But it may also be a matter of tremendous scope, such that 
the individual can determine if the life of the other flourishes or not.3 
                                                     
2 Løgstrup 1961. Kunst og etik has not yet been translated to English, but the “Rejoinder” 
[Replik] which concludes the book is translated in Niekerk 2007. Løgstrup introduces the 
term interdependence [interdependens] on page 137. 
3 Løgstrup 1956, 25 (1997, 15-16, translation modified): “[…] gælder det ikke desto mindre 
– i alle mulige grader – de forhold, hvori vi har med hinanden at gøre. Den enkelte har aldrig 
med et andet menneske at gøre uden at han holder noget af dets liv i sin hånd. Det kan være 
meget lidt, en forbigående stemning, en oplagthed, man får til at visne, eller som man vækker, 
en lede man uddyber eller hæver. Men det kan også være forfærdende meget, så det 
simpelthen står til den enkelte, om den andens liv lykkes eller ej”. Throughout this article, I 
choose to modify some of the translations, as especially the current translation of Løgstrup’s 
The Ethical Demand (Notre Dame University Press 1997 based on Fortress Press 1971) lacks 
precision and can be misleading. 
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Interdependence concerns this fundamental feature of human existence: 
when somehow involved with other people we are always involved in power 
relations. It need not be life and death, but it can be. One point I will make just 
in passing, and which will be important later on, is that until now within the 
field of Løgstrup research, focus has usually been on the negative aspect of 
interdependence: that we can destroy people’s lives, deepen a dislike or dampen 
the spirit of the other person. And there is a good reason why this has been in 
focus, because the negative aspect of interdependence is a necessary condition 
for the ethical demand. It is our failure to act, either our failure to act altogether 
or our failure to act out of genuine concern for the other, which gives rise to 
the ethical demand, i.e. the demand to act with the wellbeing of the other person 
in mind.4 For now, I just want to point out that the opposite, positive, possibility 
(a quickening of spirit, the removal of a dislike and the flourishing of the other 
person’s life) plays an equal part in the quoted passage and in interdependence.5 
Proceeding to the second question, we need to understand the term 
ontological ethics as Løgstrup uses it. He uses this term in several places to describe 
his own ethical position, most notably in the article “Ethik und Ontologie”6 and 
in Ethical Concepts and Problems [Etiske begreber og problemer].7 
In these articles, Løgstrup contrasts the ontological tradition with the 
deontological and teleological traditions in ethics. Thus, ontological ethics constitutes a 
third type of ethics, different from the two traditional ones, deontology and 
teleology. One would expect such a novel invention to warrant an elaborate 
argument and exposition, but this is not the case – at least not at first glance – 
                                                     
4 Løgstrup’s thought here bears a striking resemblance to Bernard Williams’ ‘one thought too 
many’ objection. However, Løgstrup wrote this in 1956, 25 years before Williams wrote Moral 
Luck in 1981 (cf. Williams 1981). 
5 Interdependence is of course a singular phenomenon, namely the ontological fact of life 
that we are always entangled in power relations and depend on each other. However, it is 
crucial for the purpose of this article to be aware of the duality of possibilities, or aspects, of 
interdependence (implicit in Løgstrup, but not sufficiently unfolded) that we can have either 
a positive or a negative influence on other people, just as they can have a positive or a 
negative influence on us. 
6 Løgstrup 1960, translated to English in the appendix of the 1997 edition of The Ethical 
Demand as “Ethics and Ontology”. 
7 Løgstrup 1971. 
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as Løgstrup uses just three sentences in Ethical Concepts and Problems to describe 
it. The first of these sentences reads: 
The ethical demand receives its content from the fundamental condition that we live 
under and which we are powerless to change, namely that the life of the one person is 
entangled with that of the other person, and so it consists in taking care of the part of 
the other person's life which as a result of this entanglement is at one's mercy.8 
After this, he quotes Luther as stating that “Nature teaches as love does”, 
emphasising in parentheses that by ‘nature’ he understands “the unchangeable 
fundamental conditions [of life]”. And finally, Løgstrup repeats the clause from 
The Ethical Demand where he uses the analogy of the prism to show how the 
ethical demand is refracted through our various types of personal relations, 
spouse, parent, teacher or pupil, etc. (cf. Løgstrup 1956, 124-125, Løgstrup 
1997, 106-108). After having read this very brief characterization of ontological 
ethics, it is no wonder one might feel at a slight loss, until one realises that in 
fact the rest of the book is an exposition of ontological ethics, although the 
exposition is by no means obvious or elaborate. 
However, we do learn one central thing here, namely that by ontological ethics 
Løgstrup is referring to an ethics rooted in the fundamental and unchanging 
condition of our life, and that this condition is that our lives are entangled with 
one another in various types of relations. The foundation of ontological ethics 
is thus interdependence.9 
But does Løgstrup not rather see trust or self-exposure [selv-udlevering] as 
the basis of his ethics?10 We may have already quoted Løgstrup as stating that 
                                                     
8 Løgstrup 1971, 12, my translation, English translation is ongoing: “Fra det grundvilkår, vi 
lever under, og som det ikke står til os at ændre, nemlig at den enes liv er forviklet med den 
andens, får den etiske fordring sit indhold, idet den går ud på at drage omsorg for det af den 
andens liv, som forviklingen prisgiver en”. 
9 To people familiar with Løgstrup’s later writings through the 1970s, this may seem too 
reductive, as Løgstrup in his late writings broadens the scope of humane existence and its 
dependencies to include a greater ecosystem than merely other people. Here we find central 
themes such as historicity, nature and sensation to be crucial elements of human existence and 
hence parts of the ontological basis of our life (cf. Løgstrup’s late works Creation and 
Annihilation and Source and Surrounding which are both partially translated into English in Dees 
1995). 
10 I translate ’udlevering’ and ’selv-udlevering’ as exposure and self-exposure rather than 
’surrender’ or ’delivery’ (‘self-surrender’ and ‘self-delivery’ respectively) because the former 
come closer to signifying the passive implication which is crucial to understanding Løgstrup’s 
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interdependence is the fundamental condition or core phenomenon, but we 
could have found a different passage containing a seemingly different answer: 
Regardless of how varied the communication between persons may be, it always 
involves the risk of one person daring to venture out in the hope of being received. 
This is the essence of communication and it is the fundamental phenomenon of ethical 
life.11 
This passage indicates that the ethical demand is based on trust and self-
exposure as its core phenomena, an interpretation found in several places in the 
secondary literature. 
I think that the answer to this particular problem is not to see 
interdependence and self-exposure as mutually exclusive or different 
phenomena. Actually, Løgstrup makes one other mention of “the fundamental 
phenomenon of ethical life” in The Ethical Demand, this time in the context of a 
discussion of how we cannot avoid having power over persons with whom we 
associate. The fundamental ethical phenomenon cannot be our supposed good 
deeds, Løgstrup writes: 
[…] and therefore the fundamental phenomenon of ethical life is something else. 
Because power is involved in every human relationship we are always in advance 
compelled to decide whether to use our power over the other person for serving him 
or her or for serving ourselves.12 
Here Løgstrup clearly speaks of interdependence as the fundamental 
ethical phenomenon in a way that suggests that he understood self-exposure 
and interdependence as intimately connected. They imply each other: being in 
inescapable power relations exposes us; and being exposed means being in 
somebody’s power. There would be no interdependence, if we were not 
exposing ourselves; and there would be no self-exposure without 
interdependence. 
                                                     
position. To be exposed is a passive state, while to surrender oneself and to deliver oneself 
involves an active subject. Here we need to keep the passive form in mind, as will be shown. 
11 Løgstrup 1956, 27 (1997, 17 translation modified): “På hvor mangfoldig vis 
kommunikationen mellem os end kan arte sig, den består altid i at vove sig frem for at blive 
imødekommet. Det er nerven i den, og det er det etiske livs grundfænomen”. 
12 Løgstrup 1956, 66 (1997, 53): “[…] og det etiske livs grundfænomen er derfor et andet. 
Fordi der er magt i et hvilket som helst forhold mellem mennesker, er vi altid på forhånd 
spærret inde – i den afgørelse, om vi vil bruge magten over den anden til hans eller til vort 
eget bedste”. 
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Basic trust plays a role here, but not as a candidate for being the founding 
phenomenon of ontological ethics. Løgstrup only brings basic trust to the table 
because he needs a phenomenon that counter-balances the risks of 
communication and human interaction: why does communication not break 
down when it is such risky business? Trust and social norms are his only 
candidates in The Ethical Demand. However, this changes with the introduction 
of the sovereign expressions of life, to which we will return later. 
        We now turn to the third question, how interdependence serves as the basis 
of Løgstrup’s ontological ethics. 
In one sense, the answer seems very straightforward. Interdependence 
means that in all human interaction we hold power over each other, and 
ontological ethics is just Løgstrup’s word for an ethics springing from this 
ontological fact, an ethics concerned with what we ought to do with the power 
we have over the other person. I call this answer straightforward because it 
leads down the well-known path (well-known at least to Løgstrup scholars) to 
the ethical demand: that we should use this power to take care of the other 
person’s life, a demand that is silent, one-sided, radical, and unfulfillable. Let us 
briefly explore this aspect of ontological ethics before we turn to the possibility 
of there being more to ontological ethics than this. 
 
2. The Ethical Demand. Ontological ethics based on the negative aspect of interdependence 
As mentioned, Løgstrup’s analysis of the ethical demand provides four 
characteristics: it is silent, one-sided, radical, and unfulfillable. Here, I will just 
add a few remarks to these characteristics: 
That the demand is silent means that it cannot be captured in any fixed 
form in language or culture. Any cultural understanding of the ethical demand 
and any verbal attempt to formulate it in a concrete action-guiding norm are 
bound to fail. One way to say this is that in any particular situation it may be an 
open question whether it is ethically appropriate to lie, steal, or even kill, etc. Here 
Løgstrup’s analysis encourages a terminological distinction between moral 
(morality) and ethics – a terminology he unfortunately does not follow himself, 
but one that we can reconstruct: Any formulation of a cultural moral norm or 
set of cultural moral norms will always have to answer to and are conditioned 
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by a pre-cultural ethical standard, namely the silent ethical demand. The ethical 
demand tells us only that we have to act in order to take care of the other person, 
not how to do so. 
In the Løgstrup reception, a lot of energy has gone into debating the one-
sidedness of the ethical demand: that it implies a certain understanding of life as 
given to us as a gift, whether this implies a giver or not, whether this valuation 
and high praise of life is accurate or not, etc. I will not go into these debates 
here, as they serve no purpose for the problem at hand. Here, it should be 
sufficient to emphasize that the one-sidedness of the ethical demand means that 
we violate the demand if we use our power to demand something in return 
from the other person. 
This straightforward interpretation of ontological ethics runs into a kind 
of dead-end when it comes to the radicality and unfulfillability of the demand. 
These two characteristics are closely interconnected in (at least) two different 
ways. I will call one of them logical (or necessary) and the other one 
anthropological (or contingent). Let us begin with the latter, the anthropological 
connection between radicality and unfulfillability. 
         To understand the radicality of the demand, we need to remember that 
The Ethical Demand analyses “[…] the relationship to the other person which is 
contained within the religious proclamation of Jesus of Nazareth” (Løgstrup 
1956, 9 (1997, 1)). This relationship consists in the commandment to love the 
neighbour, a commandment radicalized in The Sermon on the Mount where Jesus 
proclaims that you should also love the enemy. This is fundamental to the 
radicality of the demand. It demands of us not only to do certain things for 
certain people, but that we should love all people (including our enemies), and 
from this love the good actions spring forth, just as a good tree brings forth 
good fruits (here we clearly see Luther’s influence on Løgstrup).13 Now, as it 
happens, this runs contrary to human nature, according to Løgstrup. We are 
unable to love our enemies, and we realize so after reflecting on it, unless we lie 
to ourselves and indulge in hypocrisy (Løgstrup 1956, 173-177 (1997, 151-154)). 
The demand may very well call for us to love the person who tortured and killed 
our loved ones, but here the demand is repelled by our nature (Løgstrup 1956, 
                                                     
13 Cf. Matt 7:17-18. 
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67 and 124 (1997, 55 and 107-108). In this respect, the radical demand is 
unfulfillable because of our human nature, i.e., based on the anthropological 
connection between radicality and unfulfillability. 
The logical or necessary connection between radicality and unfulfillability 
consists in the demand’s demanding to be superfluous: 
By willing to be sovereign in our own life, by refusing to receive life as a gift, we place 
ourselves in a sharp contradiction: every attempt to obey the demand turns out to be 
an attempt at obedience within the framework of a more fundamental disobedience. In 
other words, what is demanded is that the demand should not have been necessary. 
This constitutes its radicality.14 
The root still lies within Løgstrup’s anthropology, that human beings want 
to be sovereign and refuse to take life as a gift, but here the radicality also points 
toward a different sense of unfulfillability, constituted by the framework of our 
anthropological shortcomings. This new unfulfillability is logical (or necessary) 
in nature, because the framework makes the fulfillability of the demand 
impossible. When the demand demands that it should not have been necessary, 
then it is logically impossible to fulfil it, because acting within the framework of 
the demand does not dismantle the demand in any way. The action should have 
been the fruit of spontaneous love, and when this did not happen no 
subsequent action can change this fact.15 
         The straightforward interpretation of ontological ethics is that it is 
concerned with what we ought to do with the power we have over the other person 
in our interdependent life. As we have seen, it runs into a dead-end because the 
radicality and the unfulfillability actually undermines the entire project of 
establishing an ethics that has to do with how we ought to act, what we should 
do in order to take care of the other person. What is demanded of us cannot be 
fulfilled – exactly because it is demanded of us. David Bugge refers to this precise 
problem and suggests that for this reason we should speak of Løgstrup’s critique 
                                                     
14 Løgstrup 1956, 168 (1997, 146): “Med vor modstand imod modtagelsen af vort liv har vi 
anbragt os selv i den tilspidsede modsigelse, at ethvert forsøg på at lyde fordringen aldrig 
bliver til andet end et forsøg på at være lydig imod den indenfor en mere fundamental 
ulydighed. Med andre ord, hvad der fordres er, at fordringen ikke skulle have været 
nødvendig. Deri består dens radikalitet”. 
15 David Bugge draws a similar distinction in his companion to The Ethical Demand; cf. Bugge 
2011, 207-208. For further work on Løgstrup’s anthropology (and ontology), see Rabjerg 
2017. 
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of ethics rather than of Løgstrup’s ethics (cf. Bugge 2012). This aspect of 
Løgstrup’s ontological ethics has to do with human interaction that has gone 
wrong, which is also why Løgstrup refers to it as a substitute ethics – a substitute 
for what should actually have been realised in the interdependent relation to the 
other person.16 I will therefore propose a different, but supplementary, way of 
understanding Løgstrup’s ontological ethics, namely as an analysis concerned 
not with what we should do, but rather with what can happen to us in our 
interdependent life. 
 
3. Sovereign expressions of life. Ontological ethics based on the positive aspect of 
interdependence 
The interpretation of Løgstrup’s ontological ethics that I will present in the 
following is based on what was earlier called the positive aspect of interdependence, 
namely that the possibilities for a quickening of spirit, the removal of a dislike, 
and the flourishing of the other person’s life also lie within the structure of 
interdependence. Conversely, the straightforward interpretation, which we 
discussed earlier, focuses on the negative aspect, the threat we pose to each other, 
that we can cripple, destroy or dampen the spirit of the other person. The 
importance of the positive aspect of interdependence relies heavily on 
Løgstrup’s anthropology, and therefore this is where we will begin. 
Løgstrup is a metaphysical dualist in a very specific sense. His 
anthropology rests upon a division or a contraposition (in a non-logical sense!) 
between the human being on the one hand and interdependent human life on 
the other. This means that in order to be able to grasp Løgstrup’s anthropology, 
we have to at the same time understand it through its opposite, his 
understanding of human life. In the chapter “The wickedness of man and the 
goodness of human life” in The ethical Demand, Løgstrup pinpoints this division 
or contraposition in his ‘doctrine’ not as Luther of two Kingdoms but of two 
accounts. This doctrine is crucial if we are to be able to understand Løgstrup’s 
conception of both the human being and of human life – and, I will argue, his 
ontological ethics: 
                                                     
16 Løgstrup expands on this in Controverting Kierkegaard [Opgør med Kierkegaard], cf. Løgstrup 
1968, 127-131 (for an English translation: Niekerk 2007, 77-81). 
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To show trust and to expose oneself, to entertain a natural love is goodness. In this 
sense goodness belongs to our human life though we are evil. Both apply completely 
so there cannot be made a reckoning of this. Even though this is done often enough 
when it is said, there is “at least some” good in man! To this we can only reply, no, 
there is not! When speaking of the notion that there is “at least some” good in man 
one means to subtract something from evil and then add it to goodness – on the 
individual’s own account17. As if trust and natural love were not given to man, but 
were man’s own achievements and belonged to the account of the self. 
But there is nothing to subtract from the evil of man. The self brings everything under 
its selfish power. In it man’s will is bound. The demand to love, which as a demand is 
addressed to our will, is an unfulfillable demand. 
Nor can anything be added to the goodness of human life. It is there and is there in 
completeness, but beforehand – always beforehand, among other things in the realities 
of trust and love.18 
What Løgstrup does here is to distinguish between what we, ourselves, are 
responsible for (what we can do) and what we are not responsible for (what can 
happen to us). The result is the Doctrine of two accounts: the ego cannot take credit 
for trust and love, because the ego is not responsible for their being there, thus 
trust and love cannot be reckoned as entries on the account of the selfish and 
wicked self. Therefore, they must be credited to the other account – the account 
of the goodness of human life such as it is given to us. In this way, Løgstrup 
can be labelled as an anthropological pessimist (the human being is wicked and 
does not by itself have the means for doing good at its disposal) and an 
                                                     
17 Here and in the following, ’account’ is a translation of the Danish word ‘konto’ which 
means ‘(bank) account’, not ‘explanation’; so, the quote implies an analogy where ‘the 
account of the selfish self’ and ‘the account of the goodness of human life’ are seen as two 
separate (financial) accounts. 
18 Løgstrup 1956, 161 (1997, 140-141, translation modified): “At vise tillid og udlevere sig, at 
nære en naturlig kærlighed er godhed. I den forstand hører godheden vort menneskeliv til, 
skønt vi er onde. Begge dele gælder fuldt ud, så der ikke kan gøres et regnskab ud deraf. 
Skønt det ofte nok sker, når det hedder: “noget” godt er der altså ved mennesket! Hvortil 
kun er at sige: Nej, der er ikke! I den tale om, at der da er “noget” godt ved mennesket, vil 
man nemlig trække fra ondskaben og lægge til godheden – på den enkeltes egen konto! Som 
om tilliden og den naturlige kærlighed ikke var skænket mennesket, men var dets egne 
bedrifter og hørte hjemme på selvets konto. Men der er ikke noget at trække fra menneskets 
ondskab. Selvet tager alt i sin selviskheds magt. I den er menneskets vilje bunden. Fordringen 
om at elske, der som fordring er rettet til vor vilje, er uopfyldelig. Heller ikke er der noget at 
lægge til menneskelivets godhed. Den er der og er der fuldt ud, men i forvejen – og altid i 
forvejen, blandt andet i tillidens og kærlighedens realiteter”. 
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ontological optimist (the ontological basis of our interdependent existence is 
fundamentally good).19  
In order to show why this is so, Løgstrup makes the point that love and 
trust “[…] are distorted when I take credit for them myself, regarding them as 
my own achievement” (Løgstrup 1956, 159 (1997, 139)). They contain or imply 
(again not in a strictly logical sense) what he calls an understanding of our 
existence – i.e. the understanding that the person whom we love is given to us. 
Vice versa, our reservation (i.e. our distrust) and selfishness must be understood 
as our own achievements – they too are distorted (or rather I am) when I take 
them not as my own fabrication, but as given: 
Of course, I can insist that I cannot help my reservation and selfishness, because this 
is the way I was created. And since I didn’t create myself I cannot accept the 
responsibility or the blame for how I am. But the result of such abstract arguments is 
that “my” thoughts, “my” actions, “my” feelings etc. are no longer mine, as surely as 
they are only mine if I assume responsibility for my life by accepting the guilt for who 
I am and what I do. In short, I become no one.20 
This understanding, that trust is given of human life and distrust is my 
fabrication or responsibility, is an interpretation, Løgstrup admits. It is not 
logically necessary or scientifically evident in any positive or demonstrable way. 
As such Løgstrup acknowledges that the distinction between on the one hand 
trust and love and on the other hand distrust and selfishness, “[…] is a 
metaphysical distinction inasmuch as it contains an understanding of human 
existence in its totality” (Løgstrup 1956, 160 (1997, 140)). We can claim that trust 
and love are our personal achievements, Løgstrup says, but in doing so we stifle 
trust and love in self-gratulation. 
Consequently, it is Løgstrup’s point that we have to keep two accounts: 
an account of the selfish self and an account of the goodness of human life. At 
the root of this Doctrine of Two Accounts lies Løgstrup’s anthropology, where 
                                                     
19 For further work on this, see Rabjerg 2014, 135; Rabjerg 2016, 19-25; and Rabjerg 2017, 
201-205. 
20 Løgstrup 1956, 159f (1997, 139): “Selvfølgelig kan jeg godt påstå, at jeg ikke kan gøre for 
min forbeholdenhed og selviskhed, for sådan er jeg skabt. Og da jeg ikke har skabt mig selv, 
kan jeg ikke tage ansvaret eller skylden for, hvordan jeg er. Blot bliver resultatet, at ’mine’ 
tanker, ’mine’ handlinger, ’mine’ følelser o.s.v., ikke længer er mine, så vist som de kun er 
mine, om jeg overtager mit liv ved selv at være skyld i og tage ansvaret for, hvem jeg er og 
hvad jeg gør. Kort sagt, jeg selv bliver ingen”. 
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man is conceived of as a prisoner of his own selfish self. When on our own, we 
human beings are captives of our own selfish power, because we are at the 
mercy of our own fabrications, our own self-encircling thoughts and feelings. 
Løgstrup formulates this for the first time (as far as I am aware) in a journal 
from the late 1930s: 
We are captives within ourselves. We can only be set free by fellow man. […] Man is 
his own prisoner; that is the hopelessness of it for it means that we can in no way free 
ourselves – any attempt to do so will only catch us up even further in our own self. 
[…]. For on our own we can do nothing but immerse ourselves deeper and deeper 
into bondage and reflection and self-centeredness, in short in pride. – Liberation only 
comes through fellow man. And we can only liberate our fellow man – and through 
him or her be liberated from our own imprisonment within ourselves.21 
Thus, fellow man can liberate us from being captives of our own 
selfishness and reflection. This is where the positive aspect of interdependence 
(Løgstrup’s ontological optimism) plays a crucial role. 
In The Ethical Demand, Løgstrup discusses the phenomenon that we can be 
in the power of another person through his or her mere presence, to be under 
the spell of the other person (Løgstrup 1956, 22f (1997, 13-14)). When separated 
from other people, we create pictures of them in antipathy: 
However, when we are in direct association with that person, the picture usually breaks 
down; the personal presence of the other dispels it. […] The actual presence of the 
other leaves no room for our picture.22 
Moreover, Løgstrup takes this point even further: 
                                                     
21 Løgstrup (year unknown), 34, my translation: “Vi er fangne i os selv. Befris kan vi kun af 
vort medmenneske. […] Mennesket er sin egen fange; det er det haabløse, for det betyder, 
at vi ikke paa nogen maade kan befri os selv – ethvert forsøg vil kun fange os endnu mere i 
os selv. […] Fordi selv kan vi overfor os selv intet andet end fange os mere og mere ind i 
ufrihed og refleksion og selvoptagethed, kort sagt i hovmod. Befris kan vi kun af vort 
medmenneske. Befri kan vi kun vort medmenneske – og ved ham og hende befris fra vort 
fangenskab i os selv”. 
22 Løgstrup 1956, 22 (1997, 13, translation modified): “Men i det personlige samvær sker det 
– normalt – at billedet bryder sammen. Den andens personlige nærvær udsletter det. […] 
Den andens tilstedeværelse lader der ikke være plads til ens billed”. 
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Not wanting to let the other person emerge through words, deeds, and conduct, but 
to hinder this instead by our suspicion, by the picture we have formed of him or her 
as a result of our antipathy, is to deny life.23 
Which ‘life’ is denied by this suspicion and by the picture we refuse to let 
go of? The answer is Interdependent life. The presence of the other person has an 
effect on us, because our attention is drawn away from our own imagery and 
fabrications towards the other person. This is what Løgstrup also calls self-
forgetfulness and immediacy. Interdependence being the ontological condition 
of human social life, the mere presence of the other person will influence us, at 
the very least the possibility of this influence is always there through the 
presence of the other person. The other person’s influence can set us free from 
our self-imprisonment, and this is the positive aspect of interdependence: the 
other person can quicken our spirit, remove a dislike and cause our life to 
flourish, as Løgstrup writes in The Ethical Demand. And to fight against this 
power rooted in interdependence is to deny life, i.e. to deny human life understood 
as a life in social relations, to deny the ontological foundation of ethics. 
This line of reasoning, where Løgstrup draws up his Doctrine of Two 
Accounts and its perspective on ethics, continues in Løgstrup’s later work, 
Ethical Concepts and Problems from 1971. Here he counters the misunderstanding 
that the insistence on the goodness of the ontological account, the account of 
human social life, in any way inhibits the radical evil of the anthropological 
account, the ego’s account. It is essential to understand, he says, that good and 
evil are not on the same ontological level. Therefore, the disclosure of our 
selfishness and destructive egotism can be stressed radically without this being 
redeemed in any way by the disclosure of the inherent goodness in human life. 
And vice versa, the goodness of human life can be unfolded to its very core 
without reducing our selfishness even in the slightest degree. The radical evil of 
the human being is in no way lessened by the fact that there are such things as 
love and trust – or sovereign expressions of life – as he now calls them. 
What are these sovereign expressions of life really, we may ask. Løgstrup 
gives us a list of phenomena (love, trust, openness of speech, mercy), and he 
                                                     
23 Løgstrup 1956, 23 (1997, 13, translation modified): “Ikke at ville lade den anden komme 
til i ord, gerninger og opførsel, men søge at hindre det med sin mistænksomhed, med sin 
antipatis billed af ham eller hende, er livsfornægtende”. 
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states that in these sovereign expressions of life man is immediate and free. 
They are ontological phenomena in which we may act and reflect for the good 
of the other person, rather than for the good of our ego; in them we are self-
forgetful rather than self-absorbed. The fact that they are ontological means 
that they are rooted in interdependence, i.e. that they are rooted in the other 
person. The other person is the immediate origin of the sovereign expressions 
of life. This is exactly what sovereignty means. The sovereignty of the sovereign 
expressions of life lies in their power to penetrate our self-confinement. This 
means that “my” trust is not caused or constituted by me, but it is an influence 
or impression caused by fellow man in which I am temporarily relieved of my 
reservations, self-centeredness and self-reflection, thus enabling me to be 
immediately captured by my fellow man instead of being captured by my own 
ego. The passive form here is crucial! I am caused to be trusting by the other. “My” 
concern for the other is not my concern but my being concerned by the other. This 
is the reason why Løgstrup writes in Norm and Spontaneity that: 
The sovereign expression of life preempts us; we are seized by it. […] the expressions 
of life normally sustain all human interaction.24 
And: 
The presence of the other person elicits the trust and sincerity from the first person; 
the distress of the other person elicits the mercy of the first person.25 
The two accounts are not on the same ontological level, Løgstrup writes 
in Ethical Concepts and Problems, and this is why, in Løgstrup’s ontological ethics, 
we must distinguish sharply between the encircling thoughts and emotions (e.g. 
distrust, hatred, jealousy) on the one hand and the sovereign expressions of life (e.g. 
trust, openness of speech, love, mercy) on the other. The encircling thoughts 
and emotions are written on the account of the self (the anthropological 
account) because they are our fabrications and our way of capturing ourselves in 
our own selfishness. They are what we can do in our social life; hence they are 
                                                     
24 Løgstrup 1972, 17-18, translated in Niekerk (ed.) 2007, 84, translation modified: “Den 
suveræne livsytring kommer os i forkøbet, vi gribes af den. […] de [bærer, BR] ethvert 
samvær, normalt”. 
25 Løgstrup 1972, 22, translated in Niekerk (ed.) 2007, 88, translation modified: “Den anden 
persons nærvær kalder den første persons tillid og oprigtighed frem, den anden persons 
ulykke kalder den første persons barmhjertighed frem”. 
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expressions of the self – not expressions of interdependent of life. However, the 
sovereign expressions of life are entries on the account of human 
interdependent life (the ontological account) meaning that they are ways of 
being liberated from ourselves by the other. They are what can happen to us in 
our social life. The ontological difference between them is absolute, because 
they originate from and are caused by two very different sources, namely the 
self and the other person respectively. Because of this, Løgstrup’s ethics is 
precisely an ontological ethics, not an anthropological. This means that it is not 
rooted in what the individual can do, but rather in what can happen to the 
individual because he or she is part of and entangled in interdependent human 
life, where our own selfish power can be overpowered by the sovereignty of the 
presence of the other person. 
Thus, Løgstrup can subscribe completely to Nietzsche’s disclosure of the 
human being’s destructive, egotistical and hypocritical nature (Nietzsche’s 
anthropology) and still criticize Nietzsche’s nihilistic ontology. According to 
Løgstrup, Nietzsche’s brilliant disclosure of human nature makes him partly 
blind. His mistake is that he does not make the ontological distinction between 
the two accounts: 
He does not see that in the midst of the hypocrisy we come together in each other’s 
trust. He has no sense of the fact that when, in spite of all our hypocrisy, we still go 
through our life together more or less in one piece, we owe it to sovereign expressions 
of life that we do not owe ourselves.26 
Nietzsche does not realize that by laying bare our destruction and 
perversion of life he actually makes the discovery of life’s goodness possible. 
The problem is that Nietzsche keeps only one account, and that is the account 
of the self, Løgstrup emphasises, “[b]ut there are two accounts to keep and to 
distinguish from each other, the account of our given life and the account of 
our ego”.27 Nietzsche fails to see that human nature stands in opposition to an 
essential goodness inherent in human life. 
                                                     
26 Løgstrup 1971, 23, my translation: “Han ser ikke, at midt i hykleriet mødes vi i hinandens 
tillid. Han mangler sans for, at når vi trods alt hykleriet alligevel kommer så nogenlunde 
helskindede fra vort liv sammen, skyldes det livsytringer, som vi ikke skylder os selv”. 
27 Løgstrup 1971, 23, my translation: “Men der er to konti at føre og at holde ude fra 
hinanden, vort givne livs konto og vort egos konto”. 
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If Løgstrup’s diagnosis of ethics, of the human being, and of 
interdependent human life is correct it raises the following question: Does it 
imply a passivity of the ethical subject? Through myself I can only act selfishly, 
so should I not just live my life and wait for unselfishness (in the shape of 
sovereign expressions of life) to come along on its own premises? Of course, 
whenever the sovereign expressions of life fail to materialize I am called to 
perform substitute actions, to act as if they had actually materialized. As Løgstrup 
writes in Norm and Spontaneity: 
If the sovereign expression of life is wanting, it does not mean that we must abandon 
the outcome of agency to which it was directed. That can still be aimed at, except that, 
with the attitude of mind falling short, it is now aimed at as an outcome demanded.28 
29 
It should be noted that speaking of the sovereign expressions of life as a 
kind of passivity can be misunderstood. They do enable us to act, as is the case 
for the Good Samaritan, so we are active while under their influence. A crucial 
point here is that their influence means that I am relieved from my selfish 
preoccupation. However, the passivity has to do with how the sovereign 
expressions of life and their possibility for self-forgetfulness come into being. 
Here, the problem is that we cannot cause them to happen, and Løgstrup gives 
us no advice on how to bring them forward. On the contrary, Løgstrup 
                                                     
28 Løgstrup 1972, 19, translated in Niekerk (ed.) 2007, 85: “Udebliver den suveræne livsytring, 
er dermed ikke sagt, at handlingsresultatet opgives. Det kan stadig tilsigtes, kun bliver det nu, 
da sindelaget svigter, fordret”. 
29 To illustrate briefly, the parable of the Good Samaritan exemplifies a situation where the 
sovereign expression of life (mercy) carries or sustains the interpersonal relationship; 
according to Løgstrup, this is not an ethical situation but rather a pre-ethical. Had the Good 
Samaritan failed to act out of mercy then the situation would become ethical, because loving 
the traveller would now be demanded of him. So maybe the Rabbi and the Levite, while 
passing the traveller by, both quenched the possibility for mercy (causing the sovereign 
expression of life to be wanting and thus “the attitude of mind falling short” (i.e. love of the 
neighbour, mercy)) and chose not to act on the subsequent ethical demand (the “outcome 
demanded”); in this way they failed both pre-ethically and ethically. Had one of them stopped 
and acted because of the ethical demand then that person would still have been guilty of lacking 
the attitude of loving the neighbour, because he would then be acting through ethical 
motivation instead, doing out of duty what he should have done out of mercy or love of the 
neighbour. Moreover, because the demand demands to be superfluous (as discussed earlier) 
the ethically motivated act of helping does not fulfil the demand. 
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emphasises that we cannot make ourselves more prone or apt to receiving them. 
They elude us, when we try to grasp them or bring them about. 
This raises the question concerning the connection between the sovereign 
expressions of life and the so-called character traits. Here Løgstrup stresses that 
it is crucial to distinguish between character traits and sovereign expressions of 
life, because according to Løgstrup, any character trait can be a means for both 
good and bad (in one place he refers to dependability as a character trait), whereas 
the sovereign expression of life can never be subordinated to other goals than 
the wellbeing of the other person. Herein also lies another difference: While the 
character trait relates to a task or work, the sovereign expression of life relates 
to a person.30 However, if the sovereign expressions of life cannot be nurtured 
(as opposed to character traits, which can be nurtured) then what is supposed 
to keep us from simply waiting for the sovereign expressions of life to happen? 
Here, we can only supply a very brief answer: Without the sovereign expressions 
of life, we must live our life using morality as a secondary, albeit inferior, 
substitute for genuine love of the neighbour. This is a life of action, but of 
action within the framework of ultimate ethical failure (or fundamental 
disobedience as we saw above31). In this way, our life is governed by the 
culturally dependent and thus historically and culturally relative social norms, 
where social practises relieve the ethical pressure of human interaction. 
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